Flying blind? India bets on Russian SJ-100 amid engine and geopolitical uncertainties

India is about to start manufacturing passenger planes again after 37 years. Exciting, right? HAL and Russia's United Aircraft Corporation signed a deal on October 27 to produce the Sukhoi Superjet 100 – now rebranded as Yakovlev SJ-100 – in India. The government is hailing it as a game changer for regional connectivity and a major step toward Aatmanirbhar Bharat in aviation.

But let’s pause for a moment.

India urgently needs regional aircraft. The UDAN scheme has opened up smaller cities and towns, and projections suggest that over 200 such jets will be needed in the next decade. The last time India produced passenger aircraft was the AVRO HS-748, which rolled off HAL’s production lines from 1961 to 1988. Manufacturing planes again is undeniably historic.

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However, choosing the SJ-100 raises serious concerns. This aircraft is far from the world’s most successful model. Since its first commercial flight in 2011, only about 200 units have been built in over 14 years. In comparison, similar aircraft like the Embraer E-Jets or Bombardier CRJ series have sold in the thousands. The SJ-100 has faced international struggles, with many airlines discontinuing its use due to maintenance issues and sanctions-related spare parts problems.

The engine situation complicates matters further. The SJ-100 originally used the PowerJet SaM146 engine, a joint venture between French company Snecma (now Safran) and Russian NPO Saturn. Following sanctions, Russia has been attempting to develop a fully domestic engine, but it is still not ready for commercial production. So which engine will the Indian-made version use? If it’s the French-Russian hybrid, India remains dependent on Western suppliers who may be reluctant to support a Russian aircraft project. If it’s a future Russian engine, we’re betting on technology that hasn’t been proven commercially. Either way, the aircraft’s core remains uncertain – hardly a recipe for operational reliability or market confidence.

The bigger challenge is geopolitics. With Western sanctions on Russia tightening, relying on Russian technology is risky. What happens when spare parts, software updates, or technical support require Western components? The SJ-100 originally included many French and American parts. Even with Russian substitutes, will airlines trust an aircraft that may face serviceability issues?

Market acceptance is another question. Which international airlines will buy a Russian-designed aircraft manufactured in India when proven alternatives from Brazil, Canada, and Europe exist? Even if production is flawless, will it attract buyers outside India? And if it’s primarily for domestic use, why not partner with established manufacturers with stronger track records?

Arguments around jobs and manufacturing capabilities are valid, but shouldn’t India aim to build something with global demand? Something that makes Indian aviation manufacturing competitive internationally, rather than domestically dependent?

India’s aviation sector is booming, and building manufacturing capabilities is essential. But this deal feels like choosing convenience over prudence. The partner seems selected more for political alignment than commercial sense. While Air India continues to buy hundreds of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, shouldn’t India’s manufacturing ambitions aim higher?

The SJ-100 deal may create jobs and add a line to HAL’s order book. It might even serve domestic routes adequately. But is “adequate” truly the standard we should accept after nearly four decades without domestic passenger aircraft manufacturing?

Deals that make headlines today can become headaches tomorrow. One hopes this isn’t the case here, but the warning signs are hard to ignore.