Islamabad: A former CIA officer, James Lawler, has disclosed new information about the extensive covert operation that penetrated and ultimately dismantled Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s global proliferation network.

Khan, long viewed as the architect of Pakistan’s atomic weapons programme, was found to be running a vast nuclear black market that supplied technology and expertise to countries including Iran, North Korea and Libya.

‘Incontrovertible evidence’ confronted Pakistan leadership

In an interview with ANI, Lawler said the turning point came when the United States confronted Pakistan with what he described as “absolutely incontrovertible evidence” of Khan’s illicit activities.

CIA Director George Tenet had personally briefed then President Pervez Musharraf, revealing that Khan had been selling Pakistan’s nuclear secrets abroad. According to Lawler, Musharraf reacted explosively, expressing fury and shock at the betrayal. Khan was later placed under years-long house arrest, a step Lawler described as crucial for shutting down the proliferation network.

The ‘Merchant of Death’ and his global web

Lawler said intelligence agencies initially underestimated the scale of Khan’s operations, which had evolved from acquiring nuclear technology for Pakistan to exporting it illicitly to foreign clients.

“I nicknamed Khan the ‘Merchant of Death’,” Lawler said, noting the scientist’s networking abilities and decades-long influence over covert nuclear supply routes.

One of the most significant breakthroughs came with Libya. When US intelligence intercepted the German-owned freighter BBC China, investigators found containers filled with nuclear components intended for Libya’s secret programme. Lawler recalled the moment Libyan officials were confronted, leading to an admission of the covert project.

Claim: Pakistani generals were on Khan’s payroll

In one of his strongest assertions, Lawler said that Khan had “certain Pakistani generals and leaders on his payroll” while running the proliferation network.

According to him, the CIA confirmed that Khan’s operations had expanded into a structured global enterprise involving suppliers, brokers, and procurement agents across multiple countries. These activities, he said, were enabled by individuals at senior levels within Pakistan’s establishment.

How the CIA infiltrated the network

Lawler explained that he was assigned in the mid-1990s to manage operations in Europe before being given authority to “penetrate and sabotage” procurement networks tied to Khan.

His small team created front companies to pose as legitimate vendors of sensitive nuclear equipment. These supposedly credible suppliers attracted proliferators into transactions that the CIA could monitor, exploit, or disrupt.

Lawler said the guiding assessment was simple: “If you want to defeat proliferation and proliferators, you need to become a proliferator.”

The operation at CIA headquarters involved fewer than ten officers, supported by field operatives and technical teams who engineered delays, disruptions, and controlled sabotage in centrifuge and procurement systems.

Iran and the next major threat

Before shifting full-time to the AQ Khan network, Lawler had been monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities. He warned that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger a “nuclear pandemic” in the Middle East — a wave of nations seeking their own deterrents, escalating the risk of nuclear conflict or miscalculation.

The revelations add new detail to the long-secret intelligence struggle against AQ Khan’s proliferation network, which reshaped nuclear risk across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Lawler described the CIA’s campaign as essential to slowing nuclear spread and averting future crises, warning that the threat of proliferation remains alive even today.