A damning report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has uncovered severe systemic lapses in the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) and Pradhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana (SAUBHAGYA). One of the most glaring aspect pointed out by the CAG was the target number of households on the SAUBHAGYA dashboard was arbitrarily reduced from 300 lakh to 248.48 lakh to meet the March 2019 deadline.

The DDUGJY was launched by the Centre in December 2014 with the primary goal of strengthening the rural electricity distribution system. It replaced and subsumed the ongoing works of the erstwhile Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY). In July 2021, ongoing DDUGJY projects were subsumed into the Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS) to continue improving the efficiency of the distribution sector.

The SAUBHAGYA scheme was launched in October 2017 with the primary mandate of providing last-mile connectivity and electricity connections to all un-electrified households in rural area.

The CAG report, released on December 18, found that the official declaration of 100% household electrification was found to be misleading. It identifies several inconsistencies between the data reported on official dashboards and the actual ground reality.

The SAUBHAGYA initiative was aimed to provide electricity connections to all un-electrified rural households and all remaining economically poor un-electrified households in urban areas. The scheme was originally scheduled for completion by March 31, 2019, with a total outlay of ₹16,320 crore, though it was eventually closed at a cost of ₹9,246 crore.

The following points summarize the CAG's findings on these inaccurate claims:

  • While the SAUBHAGYA scheme guidelines originally estimated that 300 lakh households needed to be covered, the dashboard target was later reduced to 248.48 lakh households to align with the March 2019 deadline for declaring 100% success.
  • Despite the declaration of "saturation," seven states—including Assam, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh—reported a total of 19.10 lakh un-electrified households remaining as of March 31, 2019. In the context of the CAG report, "saturation" specifically refers to the point where 100% of the targeted households in a particular area have been provided with electricity connections. The audit reports often use the two terms interchangeably.
  • Premature Saturation Claims: Specific states declared success while significant work remained. For instance, Uttar Pradesh released 9.62 lakh connections after its March 2019 declaration, while Jharkhand declared saturation in December 2018 despite completing less than half of its sanctioned household targets by that time.
  • Lack of Verifiable Data: The audit found that household-wise details were completely missing for 2.96 lakh households included in the electrified figures on the dashboard. Furthermore, the Ministry of Power could not provide any documented data to support its claim that some households remained un-electrified simply because they were "unwilling" to participate.
  • Inability to Ascertain Genuineness: Because targets were shifted and connections continued to be released long after the deadline, the CAG concluded it could not ascertain the genuineness of the 100% electrification claim made by the participating states.

The CAG highlighted severe deficiencies in how the Union Ministry of Power (MoP) and its nodal agency, REC Limited, monitored projects and managed the disbursement of funds for the DDUGJY and SAUBHAGYA schemes.

The primary concerns expressed in the report include:

  • REC released the first instalment of grants (totaling ₹541.56 crore) to six states before mandatory requirements -- such as the execution of tripartite agreements and the appointment of Project Management Agencies (PMAs) - were met. Similarly, the third instalment was released to six states without ensuring the mandatory timely infusion of state government contributions.
  • REC requested funds from the MoP on a lumpsum estimation basis rather than providing specific project-wise unspent balances or actual physical progress data. The MoP, in turn, released these funds without insisting on the requisite details, violating its own instructions.
  • Contrary to guidelines, REC failed to maintain separate dedicated bank accounts for DDUGJY. Instead, it used accounts from previous schemes, making it impossible to verify scheme-wise receipts and disbursements from bank statements.
  • REC raised ₹500 crore through extra-budgetary borrowings in March 2020 despite already holding ₹352.32 crore in unutilized funds. This poor assessment led to an avoidable interest burden of ₹15.97 crore on the Ministry.
  • The audit found that approximately ₹734.01 crore intended for specific plans was diverted by DISCOMs in 11 states to unauthorized purposes or other schemes.
  • Duplicate Payments: Due to poor reconciliation of data, connections for the same households were claimed under both DDUGJY and SAUBHAGYA, leading to duplicate payments to DISCOMs.
  • Meetings of the Monitoring Committee (MC) and State Level Standing Committee (SLSC) were irregular and delayed. Consequently, major decisions -- including time extensions and project revisions - were often made by the MoP or REC and then ratified ex-post facto by the committees rather than through proactive deliberation.
  • Deficient Quality Monitoring: REC Quality Monitors (RQMs) were often appointed only after states had already declared "saturation" (100% electrification). This defeated the objective of concurrent monitoring during the execution phase.
  • The Ministry failed to verify the genuineness of 100% electrification claims. The audit noted that targets on the SAUBHAGYA dashboard were arbitrarily reduced to meet deadlines, and several states reported thousands of un-electrified households shortly after declaring they had reached full coverage.
  • District-level DISHA Committees, intended to provide local oversight, either failed to meet regularly or did not discuss SAUBHAGYA projects in their meetings in 13 checked states.

According to the CAG report, the 11 states (including one Union Territory region) where a total of ₹734.01 crore was diverted from intended specific plans to other schemes or unauthorized purposes are as follows:

  • Assam: Diverted ₹179.15 crore, which was transferred to the SAUBHAGYA scheme.
  • Gujarat: Diverted ₹59.35 crore, which was utilized for day-to-day activities until being transferred to Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited (GETCO).
  • Jammu and Kashmir (including Ladakh): Diverted ₹4.49 crore to create a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) from DDUGJY funds that was not credited back to the dedicated bank account.
  • Jharkhand: Diverted ₹160.99 crore from the RGGVY XII Plan to DDUGJY.
  • Madhya Pradesh: Diverted ₹212.26 crore across three different DISCOMs to other schemes.
  • Manipur: Diverted ₹2.49 crore worth of material for operation, maintenance, and other deposit works without replenishing them.
  • Mizoram: Diverted ₹0.65 crore to works not related to DDUGJY.
  • Nagaland: Diverted ₹9.19 crore, consisting of DDUGJY funds used for SAUBHAGYA works and material diverted for other purposes.
  • Sikkim: Diverted ₹0.21 crore by releasing funds for supplies for works other than DDUGJY.
  • Tripura: Diverted ₹0.22 crore from the RGGVY 12th Plan to DDUGJY.
  • Uttar Pradesh: Diverted ₹105.01 crore, which included shifting material to other schemes (such as SAUBHAGYA and SUGAM) and diverting DDUGJY funds specifically to the SAUBHAGYA scheme.

In a nutshell, the CAG report has laid bare a discerning disconnect between reported progress and ground reality as far as the DDUGJY and SAUBHAGYA schemes are concerned.