The 2026 Kerala election results must pave the way for a long-delayed constitutional debate: Has our 'First-Past-the-Post' system lost its relevance? Is it time for us to consider the Proportional Representation system and the 'List System' as a structural solution?

As the dust settles on the 2026 Kerala Assembly elections, certain structural flaws in democratic representation become clearly visible before us. The United Democratic Front (UDF) has swept to power with a historic majority, winning 102 out of 140 seats. Meanwhile, the Left Democratic Front (LDF) was reduced to just 35 seats, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) could manage a mere three seats.

To a superficial observer, this appears to be a clear and unequivocal mandate from the people. However, beneath the surface lies a serious mathematical reality that challenges the very essence of our claims to representation. A close scrutiny of the votes polled by the citizens reveals a massive disparity between the mandate they delivered and the legislative assembly they received. The UDF captured 72.86% of the seats in the assembly on the back of just 44.19% of the popular vote. On the other hand, the LDF, despite maintaining a 32.82% vote share, received a meager 25% of the seats. Furthermore, the NDA, which secured a 12.76% vote share, obtained a paltry 2.14% representation in the assembly.

When these figures are analyzed using the 'Gallagher Index'—a mathematical tool used by political scientists to measure the disproportion between votes received and seats won—the resulting score is shocking: 23.46. The Gallagher Index is a mathematical scale in political science developed by Irish political scientist Michael Gallagher to measure the disparity between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats won. It helps us understand how far an election outcome does justice to the actual popular mandate. A score close to zero (0) indicates excellent proportional representation, while a score above 20 signifies a severe imbalance between votes and seats.

This phenomenon is not unique to Kerala; rather, it is an unpredictable and systemic defect of the 'First-Past-the-Post' (FPTP) electoral system, where 'the first one to arrive wins.' In this complex era where India is navigating ideological polarizations and institutional anxieties, the 2026 Kerala election results must spark a long-delayed constitutional debate: Has our First-Past-the-Post system lost its relevance? Is it time for us to consider the Proportional Representation system and the 'List System' as a structural solution? This discussion becomes highly pertinent here.

The 'Winner-Take-All' Model

Our founding fathers chose the FPTP system, borrowed from the British Westminster model, primarily because of its simplicity. In a newly independent nation with low literacy rates, the process of voting for an individual representing a specific symbol was easy for the general public to comprehend. Additionally, this system prioritized government stability, creating an artificial legislative majority required for governments to rule without the looming threats of coalition partners.

However, the structural price the nation has to pay for this simplicity is the systemic manufacture of a 'winner’s bonus.' In a constituency witnessing triangular or multi-cornered contests, a candidate securing just 35% of the votes can emerge victorious. This implies that the remaining 65% of the votes cast become entirely ineffective. When such localized distortions are aggregated at the state or national level, the resulting legislature is not a true reflection of the popular will, but merely a distorted image. This system enabled the UDF, which held a mere 11.37% lead in vote share over the LDF, to manufacture a thumping two-thirds majority in the assembly. For a constitutional democracy, such an imbalance is far from healthy.

The Mixed-Member Alternative

The ideal remedy for this structural defect is the Proportional Representation (PR) system. In debates concerning electoral design, the Additional Member System (AMS) or the Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system is often highlighted as the finest synthesis of local accountability and mathematical fairness.

Here, we must distinguish between a fully 'compensatory' mixed system as seen in Germany or New Zealand, and the 'parallel' mixed system existing in our neighboring country, Nepal. Under Article 84 of the Constitution of Nepal, their House of Representatives is divided into two independent tiers: 165 seats are elected through FPTP, and 110 seats are elected through the Closed-List PR method.

If Kerala were to adopt this parallel structure of Nepal (i.e., 60% of seats via FPTP and 40% of seats via the PR Party List), the Gallagher Index would drop from 23.46 to approximately 12.5. Under this model, the UDF would secure 86 seats (61.4%), the LDF 39 seats (27.9%), and the NDA 9 seats (6.4%). Nevertheless, because this parallel system operates in separate, unlinked compartments, it cannot fully correct the deficiencies in vote share; it merely mitigates the distortion.

The true solution lies in a 'Compensatory Additional Member System'. In this method, the party-list seats are not viewed as a separate bonus, but as a corrective mechanism. If a party's popular vote share entitles them to 44% of the seats in the assembly, but they have already won 72% of the local constituency seats, they receive no additional seats from the list. Instead, the list seats are allocated to under-represented parties, turning the final legislature into an accurate mirror of the popular mandate. Had Kerala utilized this AMS model in 2026, the Gallagher Index would have dropped below 2.0.

Who Will Be the Chief Minister?

While the macro-level benefit of the Proportional Representation system is fair representation, its micro-level benefits on the internal health of political parties are equally profound. Under the FPTP system, the process of choosing a legislative party leader or a Chief Ministerial candidate always gives rise to major disputes. Since the mandate is perceived to be given to the individual rather than the party, the post-election selection of the leader degenerates into a mere numbers game and head-counting among MLAs.

Conversely, the List System of Proportional Representation completely reverses these tendencies. Here, voters cast their ballots for the party's ideologies and manifesto, rather than individuals. Since seats are allotted based on the order of preference in the published list, a representative's entry into the legislature depends entirely on the party's statewide performance. This eliminates the pressure tactics of regional satraps and local leaders.

Furthermore, by implementing the European-style 'Spitzenkandidat' (lead candidate) system, the number one rank holder on the state list can be presented to the public as the Chief Ministerial candidate prior to the elections. Through this, voters effectively choose the leader on election day itself.

A Balanced Electoral Framework

While advocating for Proportional Representation, we must not overlook its structural challenges. Government instability and the potential for disproportionate leverage gained by small, extremist, or single-interest fringe groups are the primary criticisms leveled against the PR system.

In a highly competitive political landscape like Kerala, if a pure PR or AMS model is introduced, no single front might secure a clear majority on its own. Governments would invariably be coalitions comprising multiple parties. A tiny party with just 5% of the vote share could end up playing the kingmaker and blackmailing the government to protect its narrow interests. The political scenarios of Israel and Italy serve as examples of this. Additionally, the Closed-List system vests excessive power in the central leadership of a party, which has the potential to undermine internal party democracy.

However, these challenges are entirely solvable. Germany circumvents the unnecessary pressure from tiny factions by implementing a 5% electoral threshold. Under this rule, only parties that secure more than 5% of the total vote gain representation in the legislature. Similarly, by adopting an Open-List System, voters can cast a preference vote for their preferred candidate alongside their vote for the party. This preserves the vital bond between the representative and the electorate.

The American model, where different states can adopt different electoral systems, is constitutionally emulatable for India as well. States currently possess the full authority to determine the electoral methods for local self-governing bodies. Against this backdrop, a state like Kerala, which witnesses intense triangular contests, could experimentally introduce 'Ranked-Choice Voting' for assembly elections, while the Northeastern states could experiment with the 'Mixed-Member' system based on their local political contexts. This would further strengthen Indian federalism and help make the popular mandate more accurate according to the unique democratic character of each state.

When we ponder the future of our democratic architecture, we must break free from the inertia of historical habits. Adopting a Compensatory Mixed-Member system equipped with appropriate thresholds and open-list mechanisms will guide us toward a more mature, stable, and genuinely representative democracy.

(The author is Deputy Secretary in Law Department, Government of Kerala. Views expressed are personal)