Israel had advance access to the passenger and crew information for Flydubai Flight FZ1073 before the aircraft departed Dubai for Tel Aviv.

The list included the identity and nationality of Omani co-pilot Hammam al-Hammami, who is accused of attacking the captain and attempting to seize control of the aircraft mid-flight.

Yet no security alert was raised before the plane took off, triggering questions over whether Israel’s system for vetting foreign airline crews failed.

The questions have gained fresh urgency after Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported, citing security sources, that the Transportation Ministry’s security division and Mossad check foreign flight crews and issue warnings when potential security concerns emerge. Israel’s Tax Authority has confirmed that it received the Flydubai flight’s Did you lists.

The Transportation Ministry, however, has not publicly confirmed whether it reviewed the names or whether any security assessment was carried out.

The incident took place on September 30, when flydubai Flight FZ1073, operating from Dubai to Tel Aviv, suffered a dramatic mid-air emergency after al-Hammami allegedly attacked Indian Captain Smit Machchhar with a cockpit crash axe and attempted to take control of the aircraft.

The plane plunged more than 16,000 feet before the captain managed to open the cockpit door and passengers helped overpower the co-pilot.

The Boeing 737 MAX 8 was subsequently diverted to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, where it landed safely. UAE authorities have described the incident as a terrorist attack.

Israel had advance passenger and crew data

Israel’s 2023 Powers for Collection and Analysis of Passenger Data law established a National Centre for Passenger Information Analysis within the Israel Tax Authority.

The system is designed to collect and analyse passenger and crew information for flights entering or leaving Israel, including data that can be used for counterterrorism and civil aviation security.

The law provides for advance submission of passenger and crew information, including identifying details such as names and nationality.

The legislation says specified passenger and crew data must be submitted electronically no later than 48 hours before scheduled departure, with additional data supplied at check-in and after the aircraft doors close.

However, Israel’s current NCPIA data-submission guidance makes an important distinction. Passenger PNR data is required at T-48 hours, while crew data is handled through APIS procedures and is not subject to the same 48-hour pre-authorisation process.

Crew APIS data is submitted at actual departure.

Separately, Israeli and international reports say the authorities had the Flydubai crew information ahead of FZ1073’s departure and that al-Hammami’s name appeared on the list.

The Israel Tax Authority confirmed receiving the flight’s lists, according to Haaretz.

That raises the central question: if the identity of an Omani national assigned to operate an Israel-bound flight was known to Israeli authorities, why did the system not generate a security alert?

Who was supposed to vet the foreign pilot?

The issue has also exposed an apparent dispute over responsibility inside Israel’s security establishment.

Security sources cited by Haaretz said the Transportation Ministry formally holds responsibility for checking foreign flight crews, but lacks its own intelligence-gathering capabilities.

According to the sources, that capability rests with agencies such as Mossad and Shin Bet.

A former head of Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority, Yitzhak Raz, has also questioned the system, arguing that foreign airline crews require thorough identity and security checks and that the Transportation Ministry should work with Israel’s intelligence agencies when necessary.

He has criticised the absence of a single body bringing together the agencies responsible for aviation security.

The Shin Bet, meanwhile, has said its responsibility covers Israeli airlines and security directives at Ben Gurion Airport, rather than foreign carriers, adding another layer to the question of who was actually responsible for vetting al-Hammami.

The Oman connection

The scrutiny is particularly significant because al-Hammami was an Omani national, while Oman and Israel do not have diplomatic relations.

Israeli authorities have previously said arrangements exist to prevent pilots from countries without diplomatic ties to Israel from operating flights into the country, making the presence of an Omani co-pilot on the Tel Aviv-bound flight an additional security question.

Reports have also emerged that al-Hammami had previously been barred from flying in Oman over concerns related to extremist views.

Those reports are now part of investigations into how he was subsequently able to work for Flydubai and operate international flights, although the full circumstances remain under investigation.

Where did the security chain break?

The available evidence does not establish that Israel alone was responsible for allowing al-Hammami into the cockpit.

The vetting chain involved multiple jurisdictions and institutions, including Oman, the UAE and Israel, while the circumstances surrounding his recruitment and previous employment are also under investigation.

What is established is that Israeli authorities had access to advance flight information and that al-Hammami’s identity and nationality were not hidden. Yet he was not flagged before FZ1073 departed Dubai.

That has turned the flydubai incident into a much broader aviation-security question: was the intelligence available but not analysed, was responsibility divided between agencies, or did critical information never reach the officials responsible for making the final security assessment?