Why Pakistan's nuclear policy is under global scrutiny: Report raises fresh security concerns

Pakistan's nuclear strategy has once again come under international attention after a report argued that the country's evolving command structure, first-use doctrine and tactical nuclear weapons programme together increase the risks associated with nuclear escalation.

The report, published by Fair Observer, says Pakistan's nuclear policy differs sharply from countries that have adopted a No First Use (NFU) commitment. Instead, Islamabad maintains that nuclear weapons remain available as a response to a broad range of military threats, a position that has long shaped its deterrence strategy against India.

According to the report, Pakistan follows a doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence, meaning its nuclear arsenal is intended to address conflict across strategic, operational and tactical levels. The report cites former senior Pakistani military official Lt Gen (Retd.) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai as saying the doctrine was designed to ensure that India's entire territory falls within Pakistan's nuclear reach.

The report argues that such a posture leaves open the possibility of nuclear weapons being used before a conventional conflict reaches its highest level, a feature that continues to draw attention from strategic analysts worldwide.

Another issue highlighted is Pakistan's reported constitutional changes concerning nuclear command.

According to the report, the Constitutional Amendment of 2025 places authority over nuclear operations with the Chief of Defence Forces, significantly expanding the military's role in strategic decision-making.

The report describes the move as unprecedented among nuclear-armed countries, claiming it centralises operational authority in a single senior military office. However, the report's interpretation has not been independently verified.

The report also revisits longstanding international concerns surrounding Pakistan's development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs).

Security experts have previously argued that such weapons, intended for use on the battlefield, lower the threshold for nuclear use during conventional conflicts. The report warns that their deployment could create a "use it or lose it" situation during fast-moving military engagements, increasing the danger of rapid escalation or unauthorised use if command-and-control systems come under pressure.

Analysts have long debated the risks associated with battlefield nuclear weapons because of the compressed decision-making timelines they create during a crisis.

A.Q. Khan network remains part of Pakistan's nuclear debate

The report also revisits the history of Pakistan's nuclear proliferation, focusing on scientist Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, whose clandestine network became one of the world's best-known cases of illegal nuclear technology transfers.

According to the report, Khan acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology during the 1970s while working in the Netherlands before establishing an international procurement network that later supplied nuclear-related equipment and designs to countries including Iran, North Korea and Libya.

Khan publicly admitted in 2004 that nuclear technology had been transferred to those countries. He was subsequently pardoned by then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and placed under house arrest for several years.

The report further cites assessments by several non-proliferation experts who have questioned whether Khan's network could have operated over such a long period without at least some awareness within sections of Pakistan's security establishment. Those claims have remained a subject of debate among analysts.

IANS inputs